Suchergebnisse

The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.' own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia's decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.

THE EVENTS OF THE SPRING OF 1990 BEGIN WITH THE BREAKTHROUGHS ACHIEVED AT THE FEBRUARY SOVIET MINISTERIAL. THESE SUCCESSES MOVED THE START TALKS FORWARD BUT ALSO SERVED AS A PRETEXT FOR A MAJOR STRUGGLE WITHIN THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND INITIATED THE CRISIS SURROUNDING ARMS CONTROL TALKS. CENTRAL AMONG THE BREAKTHROUGHS WERE THE ACCOUNT AND LIMITATIONS OF ALCMS AND THE KRASNOYARST ABM RADAR. TO UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND THE REASONS FOR THE STRONG OPPOSITION OF THE MILITARY, THIS ARTICLE REVIEWS THE ISSUES. IT ARGUES THAT A STRAIGHTFORWARD ASSESSMENT OF THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE NEW DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM IS IMPOSSIBLE: IT WAS SIMPLY A NEW REALITY WHICH NEGOTIATORS HAD TO DEAL WITH.